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TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH FORUM
THE EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIES ON
PUBLIC TRANSIT LONG-RUN COSTS3
by Kofi Obeng, * Wayne K Talley, ** and Christopher Colbum
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates sources of
public transit long-run cost increases
attributable to transit subsidies. The sources
include wage, vehicle capital price and service
increases. Service expansion is found to be the
major source. Transit cost increases related to
subsidies are classified as input price, output
and finance effects of these subsidies. Transit
costs are more responsive to federal operating
subsidies, followed in declining order by local
operating, state operating and capital subsidies,
respectively.
INTRODUCTION
Critics of transit subsidies complain
that they inflate transit costs. Previous studies
in general support this argument.' Their
hypothesis that transit costs and subsidies are
positively related has been used as a rationale
for curtailing transit subsidies at the federal
level in the United States (U.S.). The Reagan
Administration opposed federal operating
subsidies given its belief that such subsidies
resulted in increased labor costs rather than in
improving or expanding transit service. In 1980,
federal operating and capital subsidies were
$1,120.7 million and $2,787.1 million,
respectively; by 1985, federal support had
declined to $881.1 million and $2,510.3 million,
respectively (American Public Transit
Association, 1987).
Surprisingly, the literature provides
little empirical evidence of the source (or
sources) of the cost increases attributable to
subsidies. The one exception is support for the
hypothesis that increases in operating subsidies
lead to increases in transit wages, thus
increasing transit costs.2 The purpose of this
paper is to investigate sources of transit cost
increases attributable to transit subsidies. The
long-run cost relationship between U.S. transit
costs and operating and capital subsidies is
investigated. Further, the relationships
between transit wages and operating subsidies,
vehicle capital prices and capital subsidies, and
the level of transit service and operating and
capital subsidies are investigated.
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
Assume that a public (i.e, government-
owned) transit firm seeks to minimize costs4
subject to both a minimum service level
constraint and a budget constraint.1 The
minimum service level constraint is analogous to
the output constraint in the traditional cost
minimization problem in the theory of the firm.
The minimum level of service (or output) to be
provided is determined by the firm. The
implicit production function contains the
traditional arguments of output and inputs. The
budget constraint requires that revenue (fare
and non-fare such as commercial advertisements
on transit vehicles) plus operating and capital
subsidies must at least equal the total costs
incurred by the firm. Fund balances (e.g., to be
used in the purchase of equipment) may be
carried forward into the next budget period or
periods.
A formal derivation of the model
defines a Lagrangean as:
4
(i)
1 1 j i
where, W( is the ith input price; X, is the
amount of the ith input; Q is the minimum level
of transit service to be provided; h(Xn,Xu,Xt) is
the firm's production function; P is the fare (or
price) per unit of transit service; A^ is the
amount of operating subsidy received from the
jth level of government; A^ is the amount of
capital subsidy received from the jth level of
government; R is the firm's amount of non-fare
revenue; and E is the transit firm's ending
budget balance. The subscript symbols "n, u
and k" represent the inputs labor, fuel and
capital, respectively; the subscript symbols "f, s
and I" represent the federal, state and local
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governments, respectively. The Lagrangean
multipliers associated with the output and
budget constraints are Xl and X2, respectively.
The choice variables in optimization of function
(1) are the inputs (X,'s), fare (P), R, E and the
1's. Solving the first order conditions of our
model yields the long-run cost function:6
In addition to affecting the cost of
providing transit services, operating subsidies
may also have an impact on transit wages. If so,
the transit firm's wage rate Wn (or labor price)
function may be expressed as:
If a transit firm's capital price (W^) is expected
to be affected by the amounts of capital
subsidies received from various levels of
government, then the firm's capital price
function may be expressed as:
Wk
- A* Au) (4)
In addition to their effects on transit wage rates
and capital prices, subsidies may also increase
the level of transit service. For example,
increases in operating subsidies provide financial
support for financing the cost of service
expansion; increases in capital subsidies provide
financial support for acquiring vehicles to be
used in service expansions. We express the
relationship between transit service and
subsidies via the following transit service
function:
Q - QiAot, ^o.- ^ol- ^kP Ato Au) (5)
The total effect of an operating subsidy
(A0) on a transit firm's long-run costs (dC/dA,,)
is found by talcing the total differential of cost
function (2) and then dividing by dA0, i.e.,
dc/dA„ = (ac/avjfavyaij +
(X/3Q)(3Q/MJ + ac/M0 (6)
The first term to the right of the equality sign in
(6) is the "wage rate effect" of an operating
subsidy on transit costs. If <WJdA0 > 0 and
dC/dWn > 0, an increase in AD via wage rate
function (3) will result in an increase in Wn
which, in turn, via cost function (2) will result in
an increase in transit costs. The second term to
the right of the equality sign in (6) is the
"output effect" of an operating subsidy on
transit costs. If 3Q/3AQ > 0 and 3C/3Q >
0, an increase in Ac via transit service function
(5) will result in an increase in Q which, in turn,
via cost function (2) will result in an increase in
transit costs. The final term in (6) is the
"finance effect" of an operating subsidy on
transit costs.
The "wage rate effect" represents the
increase in transit costs from an operating
subsidy via an increase in wage rates, holding
the service level constant. However, it does not
necessarily follow that the increase in Ac
resulting in the increase in W, will be sufficient
to finance the wage increase, holding the service
level constant. The "output effect" represents
the increase in transit costs from an operating
subsidy via an increase in level of service,
holding input prices constant. However, it does
not necessarily follow that the increase in AD
resulting in the increase in Q and the increase
in fare revenue (following the increase in Q with
fare held constant) will be sufficient to finance
the service expansion, holding input prices
constant. Thus, we interpret dC/dAD in (6) as
the increase in the firm's budget, i.e., the budget
constraint in (1), from an increase in operating
subsidy that is necessary to finance the
remainder of the budget, i.e., in providing the
given level of service at the given input prices.
The remainder of the budget is that amount not
accounted for by the wage rate and output
effects. Hence, we interpret the "finance effect"
as a change in the budget constraint found in
function (1). In the literature (see Pucher,
Markstedt and Hirschman, 1983), dC/dAB has
been interpreted as the direct effect rather than
as the "finance effect" of an operating subsidy
on transit costs.
Similarly, the total effect of a capital
subsidy (Ak) on the transit firm's long-run costs
(dC/dAJ is the total differential of cost
function (2) divided by dAk, i.e.,
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dc/dAk = (dc/av^aVt/aiit) +
(X/dQxaQ/aij + ac/a\k a)
As with operating subsidies, the first term to the
right of the equality sign in (7) represents an
input price effect, i.e., the "capital price effect"
of capital subsidy on transport costs. The
second term represents the "output effect" and
the final term represents the "finance effect" of
capital subsidy on transit costs. For further
discussion of these effects, see the Appendix.
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
To estimate (2), the cost function is
specified as a translog function (see Christensen,
Jorgenson, and Lau, 1973).7 Firm cost (C) is
the sum of operating and vehicle capital costs.
Inputs include labor, fuel and vehicle capital.
Operating subsidies are from federal, state and
local governments. Since capital subsidies may
not be provided by all three levels of
government to a transit firm in a given time
period, we use the sum of these capital
subsidies, i.e., At - J^^- The translog cost
/
function with one output, three input prices,
three operating subsidies and one capital
subsidy variable is written as:
■ *E allnWi ♦i, '"O ♦E fV*1* * P.ln*i
♦1/2y,,1«C* ♦WJnAi ♦WE
i r*i J
♦E • E ^^"VE fV*vM«
♦eew« Kw
(«)
where, the cross product matrix is symmetric








In order to insure that (8) is positive-linearly
homogeneous, the following restrictions are
imposed:
E«i - '£>» " °.E% - " 0
. »* E»» - °-
Additional information can be introduced into
the estimation by employing Shephard's lemma.
In logarithmic form, Shephard's lemma for the
ith input can be written:
BlnCIdlnW, - (BCIdWyiPIW) - X*
,
WjC - S, W
where, x,
'
is the cost minimizing quantity of the
ith input and S, is the share of the ith input in
total cost (C). Applying Shephard's lemma
directly to (8) yields the factor share equation




( * aJnW, * J) a„\nW, *
(10)
Since the factor share equations do not add
additional parameters, it is useful to estimate
(8) and the share equations (10) together,
thereby increasing the degrees of freedom.
However, to avoid the problem of a singular
variance-covariance matrix of random error
terms (since there are only two independent
share equations), one share equation must be
deleted. Since it does not matter which one is
deleted, we arbitrarily delete the vehicle capital
share equation.
Thus, we have six equations to be
estimated: translog cost function (8), labor and
fuel share equations (10), wage rate function
(3), vehicle capital price function (4) and vehicle
mile function (5). Functions (3), (4) and (5) are
assumed to be log-linear functions. Since it is
reasonable to expect that error terms across the
six equations will be correlated, the six
equations are estimated utilizing Zellner's
(1962)seemingly-unrelated regression technique.
DATA
Cross-section data are utilized. The
primary data source is 1985 UMTA Section 15
data (Urban Mass Transportation Administra
tion, 1986). Section 15 data are quite extensive
and provide information on cost, performance,
service characteristics and subsidies (operating
and capital) received for all reporting transit
firms (i.e., firms receiving assistance from
UMTA under Section 5 or 9 of the Urban Mass
Transportation Act). Transit firms that operate
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only bus transit service (the service most
frequently provided by transit firms) are
considered in this paper. A sample of 73 transit
firms was selected.
The sampled transit systems consist
mainly of those with yearly revenues between
one million and twenty million dollars. There
are 54 such transit systems or 74 percent of the
sample, while nine systems (12 percent) have
revenues of less that one million dollars.
Comparatively, 14 percent or ten transit systems
have revenues exceeding $50 million. The
largest system in the sample earned $124 million
in revenue in 1985, while the smallest system
earned $300,000.
Since a few large firms exist in our
sample, the assumption of constant error
variance of our estimation technique may be
violated, i.e., the problem of unequal variances
or hetcroscedasticity may exist. We address this
concern by excluding a number of larger Arms
from the full sample to obtain a sub sample of
50 firms. Specifically, all firms in the full
sample with a "ratio of peak to mid-day buses in
service" of more than 1.82 (which is equal to the
arithmetic mean plus two times the standard
deviation of this variable) were excluded to
obtain the sub sample. This selection process
eliminated transit systems from the full sample
with fleet sizes exceeding 561 vehicles.
A transit firm's wage rate is based on
total labor compensation — wages and benefits.
Labor hours are obtained by multiplying the
equivalent labor data in the Section 15 report by
2080 hours (i.e., one equivalent labor unit
represents 2080 hours).8 This product is then
divided into total labor compensation to obtain
the hourly compensation rate, i.e., the firm's
wage rate (Wn).
The same source also provides data for
determining transit fuel prices. These data
include diesel fuel, liquefied nitrogen gas and
liquified petroleum gas consumed. Gallons of
these fuels consumed by a transit firm are
summed and then divided into the system's fuel
cost to obtain the weighted arithmetic mean
price per gallon, i.e., fuel price (Wu).
Information on new bus prices is taken
from actual contracts awarded to bus
manufacturers by transit firms (Metro
Magazine, 1985). The weighted arithmetic mean
of new bus prices (W) for 1985 was utilized in
the following equation to obtain the vehicle
capital price (W^ for a given transit firm:9
Wk
• W*(P+r)+ exp(-DA) (11)
where, D represents the straight line
depreciation rate for a bus (where a 12 year
replacement cycle is assumed); A is the average
age of the transit system's bus fleet; and r
represents the interest rate on high grade
Standard and Poor municipal bonds which was
10 percent in 1985 (Economic Report of the
President, 1986, p. 332). The average age of a
transit system's bus fleet (A) was computed
utilizing the following equation:
» »
where, B), is the number of buses of type b and
Afc is the average age for buses of type b for the
transit system.
By multiplying the vehicle capital price
(in equation 11) by the firm's number of buses
(EB,,), we obtain the total vehicle capital cost
(CJ for the firm, i.e.,
Ck
= (EB,)W*(D * r)«exp(-a4) <13)
I
Adding C^ to the transit firm's operating cost
yields the total cost (C) that appears in cost
function (2).
A problem with cost analyses of transit
firms is the absence of a unique measure of
output. Transit output may be measured as
produced output such as vehicle miles and seat
miles or as consumed output such as passengers
and passenger miles. Vehicle miles have been
utilized extensively in the estimation of cost
functions of transit firms;10 vehicle miles are
also used (to be consistent with the literature)
as our output measure.
Federal, state and local operating
subsidies arc symbolized by Ao(, AM and A0,,
respectively. The federal operating subsidy
program is a matching grant program for
financing transit operating deficits, requiring a
dollar of local or state operating subsidy for
every dollar of federal operating subsidy, up to
a specified maximum total federal contribution.
This maximum amount varies by locality and is
determined by a formula based on non-incentive
tiers such as local population and population
density and to a lesser extent on incentive tiers
such as passenger miles squared and cost."
Since state and local operating subsidies
generally do not entail explicit matching
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provisions, they may be classified as lump-sum
grants.12 Similarly, the federal capital subsidy
program is a matching grant program for
financing transit capital purchases, requiring a
dollar of local or state capital subsidy for every
four dollars of federal capital subsidy up to a
specified maximum total federal contribution.
State and local capital subsidies are lump-sum
grants.13
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for our variables
and the two samples are found in Table 1. The
parameter estimates from joint estimation of
translog cost function (8), labor and fuel share
equations (10), wage rate function (3), vehicle
capital price function (4) and vehicle mile
function (5) are presented in Table 2 through S.
Cost-function parameter estimates for the full
sample (73 transit firms) and the sub sample of
(SO transit firms) are in Table 2A and 2B,
respectively. Since the parameters of the labor
and fuel share equations (10) are also
parameters of translog cost function (8), their
parameter estimates are also found in Table 2A
and 2B.
The variables in our cost function have
been normalized by removing their sample
means and are presented as logarithms. For the
full sample (see Table 2A), the cost function's
first-order coefficients for vehicles miles and
input prices have the expected signs and are
highly significant. Among the first-order
coefficients for subsidies, only the coefficient for
federal operating subsidy is significant (but at
ten percent level). Similar findings follow for
the sub sample of transit firms (see Table 2B)
except the federal and local operating subsidy
coefficients are now highly significant.
In estimation of the wage rate function,
the unemployment rate (M) in the firm's local
service area was also included as an explanatory
variable to account for differences among local
labor markers.14 The estimation reveals that
the parameter estimates for state operating and
local operating subsidies are significant and
positive for both the full and sub samples (see
Table 3). The parameter estimate for federal
operating subsidy in the wage rate function is
insignificant (for both samples).15 The
parameter estimate of the unemployment rate
(M) is also insignificant. Estimation of the
vehicle capital price function reveals that the
parameter estimate for capital subsidy is
significant and positive in both samples (see
Table 4). Estimation of the vehicle mile
function reveals that the parameter estimates
for all three operating subsides are highly
significant and positive for both samples (see
Table 5). For the full sample, the parameter
estimate for capital subsidies is significant at the
five percent level and positive; for the sub
sample, it is insignificant.
Let us now investigate the total effect
of each operating subsidy on transit costs
utilizing function (6) and the parameter
estimates found in the estimated cost, wage rate
and vehicle mile functions. Since the variables
in the functions are in logarithms, we rewrite
function (6) in terms of logarithms, i.e.,




Equation (14) measures the degree of cost
elasticity with respect to each subsidy variable.
This elasticity is the sum of "wage rate effect",
"output effect," and "finance effect" operating
subsidy cost elasticities. The operating subsidy
cost elasticity for the "wage rate effect" is the
product of the wage rate cost elasticity (from
the cost function) and the operating subsidy
wage rate elasticity (from the wage rate
function). The operating subsidy cost elasticity
for the "output effect" is the product of the
vehicle mile cost elasticity from the cost function
and the operating subsidy vehicle mile elasticity
from the vehicle mile function. The operating
subsidy elasticity for the "finance effect" is
simply the operating subsidy cost elasticity from
the cost function.
Since our model was estimated utilizing
normalized data presented as logarithms, it
follows that the first-order coefficients in our
estimations may be interpreted as elasticities
evaluated at sample means. The estimated total
operating subsidy cost elasticity for each
operating subsidy and their component
elasticities taken from the various estimated
functions are found in Table 6 for both the full
and sub samples. The elasticities suggest that
transit costs are more responsive to federal than
to state and local operating subsidies and are
more responsive to local than to state operating
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*Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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TABLE 2A
Transit Translog Cost Function Estimates
(Full Sample)
Variable Parameter Estimate Variable Parameter Estimate
Constant -0.0464 Fuel Price* -0.0292* **





Fuel Price 0.0855*** Fed. Oper. Sub.2 -0.0016
(0.0052) (0.0726)
Capital Price 0.3287*
** Fed. Oper. Sub * -0.0265
(0.0057) State Oper. Sub. (0.0346)
Vehicle Miles 0.8605* ** Fed. Oper. Sub. * -0.0323
(0.0718) Local Oper. Sub. (0.0509)
Fed. Oper. Sub. 0.1001* State Oper. Sub.2 0.0254
(0.0515) (0.0228)
State Oper. Sub. 0.0307 State Oper. Sub. * -0.0002
(0.0188) Local Oper. Sub. (0.0133)
Local Oper. Sub. -0.0015 Local Oper. Sub.2 0.0223
(0.0230) (0.0221)
Capital Sub. 0.0018 Vehicle Miles * 0.0963* *
(0.0121) Capital Sub. (0.0397)
Vehicle Miles2 -0.3328* Vehicle Miles * 0.0159
(0.1807) Wage Rate (0.0141)
Capital Sub.2 -0.0018 Vehicle Miles * 0.0092**
(0.0056) Fuel Price (0.0035)
Wage Rate2 0.1350*** Vehicle Miles * -0.0251*
(0.02%) Capital Price (0.0134)
Wage Rate • -0.0369*** Vehicle Miles * -0.0044
Fuel Price (0.0058) Wage Rate (0.0033)
Wage Rate • -0.0980*
** Vehicle Miles * 0.0004
Capital Price (0.0286) Fuel Price (0.0008)
Fuel Price2 0.0661*** Vehicle Miles * 0.0041
(0.0068) Capital Price (0.0032)
Vehicle Miles * 0.0920
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.1149)
Vehicle Miles • 0.0401
State Oper. Sub. (0.0446)
Vehicle Miles * 0.0632
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0549)
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Local Oper. Sub. (0.0179)
Wage Rate * 0.0100
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0104)
Wage Rate * 0.0126**




Local Oper. Sub. (0.0061)
Fuel Price * -0.0049*
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0026)
Fuel Price * -0.0026**
State Oper. Sub. (0.0012)
Fuel Price * 0.1237**




Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0099)
Capital Price * -0.0100**
State Oper. Sub. (0.0048)
Capital Price
* -0.1215**
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0552)
*(**. ***) Significant at the 10(5, 1) percent level; standard errors are in parentheses; the system
weighted R2 equals 0.9551 and degrees of freedom are 388; variables are measured as logarithms.
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TABLE 2B
Transit Translog Cost Function Estimates
(Sub Sample)
Variable Parameter Estimate Variable Parameter Estimate
Constant -0.0098 Fuel Price* -0.0318**
(0.0215) Capital Price (0.0072)
Wage Rate 0.5724*** Capital Price2 0.1406**
(0.0082) (0.0360)
Fuel Price 0.0874*** Fed. Oper. Sub.2 -0.0401
(0.0020) (0.0479)
Capital Price 0.3403* ** Fed. Oper. Sub * -0.0797**
(0.0076) State Oper. Sub. (0.0263)
Vehicle Miles 0.8267*** Fed. Oper. Sub. * -0.0450
(0.0900) Local Oper. Sub. (0.0464)
Fed. Oper. Sub. 0.1467* ** State Oper. Sub.2 -0.0082
(0.0347) (0.0145)
State Oper. Sub. 0.0019 State Oper. Sub.
*
-0.0085
(0.0119) Local Oper. Sub. (0.0122)
Local Oper. Sub. -0.0422*** Local Oper. Sub.2 0.0274
(0.0150) (0.0163)
Capital Sub. -0.0077 Vehicle Miles * 0.1359***
(0.0077) Capital Sub. (0.0323)
Vehicle Miles2 -0.6099** Vehicle Miles * 0.0064
(0.1642) Wage Rate (0.0207)
Capital Sub.2 -0.0031 Vehicle Miles * 0.0115*
(0.0082) Fuel Price (0.0051)
Wage Rate2 0.1449*** Vehicle Miles * -0.0178
(0.0366) Capital Price (0.0197)
Wage Rate * -0.0361*** Vehicle Miles * 0.0002
Fuel Price (0.0072) Wage Rate (0.0093)
Wage Rate
* -0.1088*** Vehicle Miles * 0.0016
Capital Price (0.0350) Fuel Price (0.0013)
Fuel Price2 0.0679*** Vehicle Miles * 0.0069
(0.0076) Capital Price (0.0050)
Vehicle Miles * 0.1496
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0997)
Vehicle Miles * 0.1256**
State Oper. Sub. (0.0380)
Vehicle Miles * -0.1109*
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0534)
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Variable Parameter Estimate Variable Parameter Estimate
Capital Sub.
* -0.0442*
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0186)
Capital Sub.
• -0.0153
State Oper. Sub. (0.0080)
Capital Sub.
* -0.0243*
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0120)
Wage Rate
* 0.0191
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0142)
Wage Rate * 0.0105
State Oper. Sub. (0.0075)
Wage Rate • 0.0002
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0093)
Fuel Price * -0.0062
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0035)
Fuel Price * -0.0028
State Oper. Sub. (0.0017)
Fuel Price " 0.1520***
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0345)
Capital Price
* -0.0128
Fed. Oper. Sub. (0.0135)
Capital Price * -0.0076
State Oper. Sub. (0.0072)
Capital Price * -0.1523***
Local Oper. Sub. (0.0351)
*(**. ***) Significant at the 10(5, 1) percent level; standard errors are in parentheses; the system
weighted R2 equals 0.9789 and degrees of freedom are 250; variables are measured as logarithms.
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TABLE 3
Wage Rate Function Estimates
Parameter Estimate
Variable Full Sample Sub Sample
Constant -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0244) (0.0333)
Fed. Oper. Sub. -0.0254 -0.0070
(0.0298) (0.0433)
State Oper. Sub. 0.0538*
** 0.0482"
(0.0173) (0.0232)
Local Oper. Sub. 0.0512*" 0.0450*
(0.0164) (0.0232)
Unemployment Rate 0.3642 0.7095
(1.1419) (1.5124)
*
(**. ***) significant at the 10 (5, 1); standard errors are in parentheses; variables are measured as
logarithms.
TABLE 4
Vehicle Capital Price Function Estimates
Parameter Intimate
Variable Full Sample Sub Sample
Constant 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0252) (0.0298)
Capital Sub. 0.0275* ** 0.0310* *
(0.0103) (0.0139)
**
(***) significant at the 5 (1); standard errors are in parentheses; variables are measured as
logarithms.
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TABLE 5
Vehicle Mile Function Estimates
Parameter Estimate
Variable Full Sample Sub Sample
Constant -2.6173 x 10 s 0.0004
(0.0528) (0.0599)
Fed. Oper. Sub. 0.5054*
** 0.4316* **
(0.0643) (0.0784)
State Oper. Sub. 0.1371*** 0.1680***
(0.0375) (0.0441)







(***) significant at the 5 (1); standard errors are in parentheses; variables are measured as
logarithms.
TABLE 6
Total Subsidy Cost Elasticities
dlnC/dlnA = «cw«WA + «CQeQA + eca
Subsidy Full Sample Sub Sample
Federal 0.5201 = (0.5859)(-0.0254) + 0.4995 m (0.5724)(-0.0070) +
Operating (0.8605)(0.5054) + 0.1001 (0.8267)(0.4316) + 0.1467
= -0.0149 + 0.4349 + 0.1001 = -0.0040 + 0.3568 + 0.1467
State 0.1802 = (0.5859)(0.0538) + 0.1684 (0.5724X0.0482) +
Operating (0.8605)(0.1371) + 0.0307 (0.8267)(0.1680) + 0.0019
- 0.0315 + 0.1180 + 0.0307 - 0.0276 + 0.1389 + 0.0019
Local 0.2577 = (0.5859)(0.0512) + 0.2529 - (0.5724X0.0450) +
Operating (0.8605)(0.2664) - 0.0015 (0.8267)(0.3258) - 0.0422
- 0.0300 + 0.2292 - 0.0015 ■ 0.0258 + 0.2693 - 0.0422
Capital 0.0611 = (0.3287)(0.0275) + 0.0194 = (0.3403)(0.0310) +
(0.8605)(0.0584) + 0.0018 (0.8267)(0.0201) - 0.0077
- 0.0090 + 0.0503 + 0.0018 - 0.0105 + 0.0166 - 0.0077
Note: The symbol "e" represents an elasticity coefficient.
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subsidies. Further, for each total operating
subsidy cost elasticity, the "output effect"
operating subsidy cost elasticity is the largest
component elasticity, thus suggesting that
service expansion (and not rising wage rates)
attributable to rising operating subsidies is the
major source of the increase in transit costs
attributable to operating subsidies.
Based upon function (7), the total
effect of capital subsidy on transit costs
expressed in logarithms may be written as:
<UnCI<ttnAk
- (dtnCIdlnW^dlnWJdlnA,) *
(dlnCldlnQKdlnQIdlnA k) ♦ (15)
dlnCldlnAk
Thus, the total capital subsidy cost elasticity
(dlnC/dlnAk) is the sum of "capital price effect,"
"output effect," and "finance effect" elasticities.
The "capital price effect" elasticity is the product
of the capital price cost elasticity (from the cost
function) and the capital subsidy capital price
elasticity (from the capital price function). The
"output effect" elasticity is the product of the
vehicle mile cost elasticity (from the cost
function) and the capital subsidy vehicle mile
elasticity (from the vehicle mile function). The
"finance effect" elasticity is the capital subsidy
cost elasticity (from the cost function).
Our estimate of the total capital
subsidy cost elasticity is found by substituting
into equation (15) the various elasticities (i.e.,
first-order coefficients) found in the estimated
functions and solving. Estimates for both
samples appear in Table 6. Estimates of the
total capital subsidy cost elasticity suggest that
transit costs are less responsive to capital
subsidies than to operating subsidies. Here too,
the "output effect" component elasticity is larger
than the two other subsidy effect elasticities,
thus suggesting that service expansion
attributable to rising capital subsidies is the
major source of the increase in transit costs
attributable to capital subsidies.
Note that our results may be used by
both proponents and opponents of transit
subsidies. Proponents (e.g., transit
management) may argue that subsidies have
primarily been used to expand service.
Opponents may argue that although subsidies
have expanded service, they also have resulted
in higher wage rates and vehicle capital prices
for transit firms.
CONCLUSION
The literature suggests that transit
subsidies inflate transit costs. However, there
has been little investigation of the source (or
sources) of these cost increases, the exception
being that increases in operating subsidies lead
to increases in transit wages. This paper has
investigated sources of public transit long-run
cost increases attributable to transit subsidies. In
addition to wage increases, these sources include
increases in vehicle capital prices and service
levels.
From estimation of a multi-equation
model consisting of a transit (bus) firm's cost,
wage rate, vehicle capital price and vehicle mile
functions, transit costs in general were found to
be positively related to transit subsidies. Transit
cost increases related to transit subsidies were
classified as input price, output and finance
effects of these subsidies. The input price effect
follows from an increase in an input price
attributable to a subsidy. The output effect
follows from service expansion attributable to a
subsidy. The finance effect follows from an
increase in the firm's budget attributable to a
subsidy in order to finance the remainder of the
firm's budget not financed as an outcome of the
input price and output effects of the subsidy.
The total effect of a given subsidy on
transit costs was measured in terms of its total
subsidy cost elasticity. The total subsidy cost
elasticity is the sum of the input price effect, the
output effect and the finance effect subsidy cost
elasticities. For the total subsidy cost elasticities
for the three operating subsidies as well as
capital subsidy, the output effect cost elasticity
was the largest component elasticity — thus
suggesting that service expansion (and not rising
wage and vehicle capital prices) is the major
source of the increase in transit costs
attributable to transit subsidies. Further, the
total subsidy cost elasticities suggest that transit
costs are more responsive to federal operating
subsidies, followed in declining order by local
operating, state operating and capital subsidies,
respectively.
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. For transit subsidy studies utilizing
U.S. transit firms, see Anderson (1983),
Cervero (1984a, 1984b), Pickrell (1985),
Pucher, Markstedt and Hirschman
(1983), Pucher and Markstedt (1983).
For a study where transit firms across
countries are considered, see Bly,
Webster and Pounds (1980).
2
. Pucher, Markstedt and Hirschman
(1983) found that federal and state
operating subsidies per bus hour of
service have a positive and significant
impact on transit hourly wage rates.
The estimated parameter in their linear
hourly wage rate equation for both
federal and state operating subsidies
was 0.06.
3
. In 1982, total U. S. transit operating
subsidies from all three levels of
government were $3.6 billion; of which
25.6%, 30.5% and 43.9% were from
federal, state and local governments or
$0.92, $1.10 and $1.58 billion,
respectively. In 1986, the total transit
operating subsidies were $6.2 billion; of
which 14.2%, 35.3% and 50.4% were
from federal, state and local
government or $0.88, $2.19 and $3.13
billion, respectively (Urban Mass
Transportation Administration, 1990).
4
. During the Reagan Administration,
public transit firms were under
pressure to lower costs. Specifically,
the Reagan Administration espoused a
policy of privatizing transit service in
order to lower its cost. In 1984, the
Urban Mass Transportation
Administration (UMTA) required the
promotion of privatization as a
condition for the receipt of federal
operating subsidies. The policy
"charged localities with the responsibil
ity of demonstrating that they were
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actively encouraging private firms to
participate in the provision of new and
restructured local services. Unless
UMTA was satisfied on this score,
localities would not be able to obtain
or retain matching funds for these 7.
services" (Sclar et al., 1989, p. 9).
5. Such assumptions for a transit firm
have also been made by Kim and 8.
Spiegel (1987). Also, see Deller,
Chicoine and Walzer (1988). Our
transit Arm, however, does differ from
the one considered by Kim and Spiegel 9.
(KS). The U.S. transit firm is generally
owned and regulated by local
government. Hence, it is not a profit
seeking firm but may seek to maximize
ridership subject to a deficit constraint
subsidized by various levels of
government. The KS firm is a profit
seeking firm and a lump-sum subsidy
recipient operating under rate of return
regulation. It "will adjust its reported
profits by choosing the desired level of
output and factor inputs to the size of
a given level of subsidy in such a way 10.
that the reported rate of return per
unit of capital employed does not
exceed the reasonable amount" (Kim
and Spiegel, 1987, pp. 105-106). The
behavior of the firm under this rate of 11.
return regulatory constraint is assumed
to follow that of the Averch and 12.
Johnson (1962) model. The U.S.
transit firm generally does not operate
under a rate of return regulatory
constraint, since it is non-profit seeking
and since capital purchases are
generally financed by capital subsidies
from various levels of government.
Hence, we do not incorporate KS's rate
of return constraint in our model nor
utilize the Averch and Johnson (1962)
firm behavior model.
6. We assume subsidies to be exogenously
determined. This is a reasonable
assumption. The bases for allocating
federal operating subsidies among
transit firms, for example, are incentive
and non-incentive tiers. However, only 13.
9.2 percent of the total allocation is
based upon incentive tiers such as
passenger miles squared and cost, with
the remaining 90.8 percent based upon
non-incentive tiers such as population
size and density of urban areas.
For applications of the translog cost
function to transportation firms, see
Talley (1988).
The 2080 hours represent annual hours
per employee, i.e., a 40 hour week per
employee times 52 weeks in a year.
This equation is based upon an
equation found in Berechman and
Giuliano (1984) for determining transit
vehicle capital prices. However, unlike
Berechman and Giuliano, we do not
adjust our equation for the federal
government's subsidy share of a transit
firm's capital expenditure. The
rationale is that our budget constraint
includes capital subsidies and hence
our vehicle capital price should reflect
the firm's use of capital subsidies.
See Viton (1992) and transit cost
studies cited therein as well as studies
by Talley and Anderson (1986) and
Colburn and Talley (1992).
See footnote #6.
Transit operating subsidy programs are
specific-grant (as opposed to general-
grant) programs, since the subsidies
must be spent on transit operating
deficits as stipulated by the grantor.
The specific-grant is a lump-sum grant
if the transit firm receives a fixed sum
of money. The specific-grant is a
matching grant if the latter sum
received is variable and depends on
how much of the grantee's own
revenue (as from state or local
operating lump-sum grants) it spends
in financing the operating deficit. For
further discussion of lump-sum and
matching grants, see King (1984, Ch.
3).
For further discussion of federal
operating and capital subsidy programs,
see Talley (1983, pp. 304-307).
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14. Data for unemployment rates (M) are
those reported for October 1985 by the
United States Department of Labor
(1985). Unemployment rates (if
available) of the relevant cities in which
transit systems provided service were
utilized. If these rates were not
available, unemployment rates of the
state of the relevant cities were utilized
as proxies.
15. Shughart and Kimenyi (1991) found a
significant but negative relationship
between the transit hourly wage rate
and the percent of transit revenue that
is federal operating subsidy. Our sign
between the hourly wage rate and the
amount of federal operating subsidy is
negative but insignificant. Shughart
and Kimenyi (1991, p. 28) suggest that
one possible explanation for their
result is that "factors entering into
calculating the federal operating
subsidy amount cause transit systems in
smaller cities to receive a
proportionately greater share of
operating revenues from federal
sources than their counterparts in
larger cities who consequently rely
more heavily on state and local
subsidies." Obeng (1991) found a
negative relationship between federal
operating subsidy and cost and, like
Shughart and Kimenyi (1991),
attributes the result to overallocation
of the subsidy to small transit systems.
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APPENDIX
This appendix develops a graphical
analysis of the effect on transit costs from a
change in the operating and/or capital subsidies.
Recall, as demonstrated by equation (6) that
there are three effects on firm costs from a
subsidy change: (1) the input price effect, (2)
the output effect, and (3) the finance effect, or.
dc ac aw ac dQ ac ,,— = + — —^- +— (LA)
dA dW dA dQdA dA
Further recall that transit firm costs are mini
mized subject to two different constraints: the
production function Q-KX^JC^^) and the
budget constraint
PQ * R * E - E Wf, - J>„ - £V
' / /
The constraints are binding when the firm is in
long-run equilibrium.
Without loss of generality assume an
increase in an operating subsidy increases the
relative price of labor, holding constant the
price of capital and the price of fuel. Assume,
for the graphical analysis, no change in the use
of capital due to the introduction of the subsidy
and that the levels of all other subsidies are
equal to zero. This essentially assumes strong
separability of labor and fuel from capital.
Hence the graph will allow us to concentrate on
how changes in the operating subsidy affect the
use of labor, fuel, firm costs, and total output,
ceteris paribus. Also, so that the vertical axis of
the diagram may be considered as expenditures
on fuel and labor (sub-group costs), assume the
price of fuel is fixed at $1. Finally assume that
R = E = 0, i.e., non-fare revenue is equal to zero
and the budget is balanced. The simplifying
assumptions imply that the budget constraint
may be written as:
PQ =WJC. *X. -AV (2A)
In Figure 1, the transit firm minimizes
total cost for the output level Q0 along the
isocost line Mg-N0 as indicated by point Eg.
Total expenditures for labor and fuel are equal
to Mg. Assume that the level of transit
operating subsidy increases resulting in an
increase in the price of a unit of labor. Since
we are holding output constant, this pure
substitution effect will always cause the quantity
of labor to decrease following the increase in
total input costs. The increase in the price of
labor rotates the isocost curve to M^N,, where
equilibrium is attained at E,. Hence the
distance M,-M0 measures the cost increase due
to the input price effect.
The output effect from an increase in
operating subsidy is the increase in cost
following the expansion to a new level of service
while holding input prices constant. This is
indicated by a movement from the Q0 isoquant
tangency point Eg to the Q, isoquant tangency
point E2. Hence the distance M2-M0 measures
the output effect.
The finance effect from an increase in
operating subsidy is the increase in cost that is
necessary to finance the remainder of the
budget (in providing the new level of service at
the new labor price attributable to the input
price and output effects), where the remainder
of the budget is that amount left unfinanced by
these two effects. The cost increase incurred in
moving from Q0 isoquant tangency point E0 to
Q, isoquant tangency point Ej (i.e., at the new
service level and labor price) is measured by the
distance M3-M0. Hence the distance (M3-M0) -
(M^MJ - (M2-MD) measures the finance effect.
In summary the total effect on cost
(M3-M0) due to the introduction of the subsidy
is the combination of the input price, output,
and finance effects and is illustrated in Figure 1
as the sum of the distances M,-M0 (the input
price effect), M2-M0 (the output effect), and
(M3-MD) - (M,-M0) - (M2-MD) (the finance
effect).
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